Edward Semulka v. Brady by unknown
2010 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-8-2010 
Edward Semulka v. Brady 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010 
Recommended Citation 
"Edward Semulka v. Brady" (2010). 2010 Decisions. 1549. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/1549 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
DLD-160 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-4593
___________
EDWARD SEMULKA,
Appellant
v.
MULTIPLE JOHN DOE, Allenwood FCI and BOP Correctional Officers to be identified
through discovery; MULTIPLE JANE DOE, Allenwood FCI and BOP correctional officers to be
identified through discovery; MULTIPLE JANE DOE, Allen FCI and BOP medical staff to be identified
through discovery; MULTIPLE JANE DOE, Allenwood FCI and BOP medical staff to be
identified through discovery; MULTIPLE JOHN DOE, Allenwood FCI and BOP administrative
staff to be identified through discovery; MULITPLE JANE DOE, Allenwood FCI and BOP
administrative staff to be identified through discovery; ALLENWOOD FCI MEDICAL
DIRECTOR DR. BRADY; ALLENWOOD FCI JOHN DOE inmates; ALLENWOOD FCI
ACTING WARDEN LARA; WARDEN JERRY MARTINEZ, Allenwood FCI; 
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA POLICA AND EMPLOYEES; MULTIPLE JOHN DOE AND
JANE DOE EMPLOYEES; STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERALS OFFICE;
MICHAEL FAGELLA, Washington County District Attorney; JOHN PETTIT, Washington
County District Attorney; JOE DOE AND JANE DOE WASHINGTON COUNTY AND
CANONSBURG BOROUGH PENNSYLVANIA EMPLOYEES, DETECTIVES AND
POLICE; ASSISTANT MIKE FURMAN; CCA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY IN OHIO
WHERE PLANTIFF WAS FIRST DESIGNATED; FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-01718)
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 25, 2010
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed April 8, 2010 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Edward Semulka appeals pro se from a District Court order dismissing
his complaint for failure to prosecute under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).  For the following
reasons, we will summarily vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further
proceedings.  
I. 
On August 26, 2009, Semulka initiated this action by filing a complaint and a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  The
District Court ordered that before it would rule on the IFP motion, Semulka must file an
amended complaint in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).  Semulka
requested, and was granted, two separate extensions of time to file an amended complaint.
Semulka did not amend his complaint by the extended deadline of November 16, 2009. 
On December 3, 2009, the District Court deemed the action abandoned and dismissed the
complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order. 
Semulka filed a timely notice of appeal from that order.  
II.      
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review
the District Court’s dismissal for abuse of discretion.  Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424,
1429 (3d Cir. 1990).  We may take summary action if the appeal presents no substantial
question.  3d Cir. LAR 24.7; I.O.P. 10.6.  
III.
The District Court erred by failing to rule on Semulka’s IFP motion before
proceeding to the complaint.  There is a two-step process in evaluating motions to
proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.  “First, the district court evaluates a litigant’s
financial status and determines whether (s)he is eligible to proceed in forma pauperis
under § 1915(a).  Second, the court assesses the complaint under § 1915(d) to determine
whether it is frivolous.”  Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.3d 192, 194 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990); see also
Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the decision
of whether to grant IFP should precede dismissal of a complaint).  Thus, the District
Court should have addressed Semulka’s IFP motion in the first instance instead of
holding it in abeyance pending amendment of the complaint.    
The District Court also erred in dismissing Semulka’s complaint sua sponte
without addressing the factors set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 747
F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.1984).  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), a district
court may dismiss an action sua sponte if a litigant fails to prosecute his case or to comply
with a court order.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S.
626, 630-31 (1962).  Before doing so, however, courts are required to consider all six of
the Poulis factors: “(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice
to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery;
(3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was
willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which
entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or
defense.”  747 F.2d at 868.  We have repeatedly emphasized that sua sponte dismissal is
“extreme” and therefore “must be a sanction of last, not first, resort.”  Poulis, 747 F.2d at
867-69; United States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141, 161 (3d Cir.
2003) (“We have opined that [the Poulis factors] must be weighed by a district court in
determining whether the harsh sanction of dismissal is justified”).  Only in the rarest of
circumstances, those demonstrating the most “contumacious” of conduct, may a district
court dispense with the Poulis factors altogether.  Guyer, 907 F.2d at 1429-30; see also
Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454-55 (3d Cir. 1994).  
Here, the District Court dismissed Semulka’s complaint without balancing any of
the Poulis factors or considering whether a lesser sanction would better serve the interests
of justice.  See Guyer, 907 F.2d at 1429-30.  Nor did the court offer Semulka an
opportunity to justify his inaction.  See Ali v. Sims, 788 F.3d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1986)
(holding that the District Court’s statement that a party had “brazenly ignored” its order
was insufficient to justify dismissal).  
Accordingly, we will summarily vacate the District Court's December 3, 2009,
order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
